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Literature and the Passion of Virtue
--Lawrence Kimmel
Let others complain the age is wicked; my complaint is that it is wretched, for it
lacks passion. –Kierkegaard

Introductory Note
There has always been a reasonable concern that passion constitutes a challenge
to the ordeal of civility—that passion and pathology are close cousins if not twin siblings.
But in a time and place where political correctness seems to be replacing moral
sensibility and political biases are hawked as the morality of family values, it is
reasonable to redirect attention to a world of literature in which morality has never been
reduced to norms of social currency and where virtue still embodies a passion of
commitment that aspires to excellence.
As a codicil to Nietzsche‘s argument for the moral imperative of revaluing all
values, our own time begs recourse to a world of literature in which actions are not
simply recast in the idols and ideologies of the age—a diverse and contradictory world
that holds some promise of rediscovering a moral touchstone for critical understanding.
Moral insight, not social respectability has always been the appeal of literature and we
would do well to rediscover its sustaining spring. The world‘s great literature is a
resource for stretching imagination to test the limits of moral intelligibility. Setting aside
the commanding and comfortable authority of prescriptive righteousness in favor of a
broader and deeper understanding of the complex virtues of moral life is the risk of
literature well worth taking. It demands only that we search for a moral compass
informed by literature and life no less than politics and polls. In this light we will

proceed to analyze the idea of virtue in its original meaning of ―human excellence‖,
which requires passion in its expression.
Although our primary point of departure is the archaic literature and not classical
philosophy of Greek culture, a good deal of the earlier literature is in concert with
Aristotle‘s ―virtue ethics‖, which contends among other things that virtue is not a
function of action but an activity of the person. It is the excellence of character that
defines the moral life and virtue of human beings, not the correctness of a particular
action. If we are to speak meaningfully of virtue, of the excellence of a human being, we
require an understanding of the full range of passions of which human beings are capable.
There is an apparent contradiction in the usual way of understanding moral virtue, the
resolution of which will help to make this point.
The character of Achilles portrayed in Greek literature is whole cloth: the
excellence or virtue of his character includes his faults as well as his ―virtues.‖ This is no
less true of Odysseus or of Oedipus: their faults are also their strengths. The virtue of
these exceptional characters transcends, nor is it defined by observance of normative
prescription. A simpler way of putting this is that the excellence of a human being is not
limited to nor discovered by an analysis of her several virtues. Moral excellence is
manifest only in the fullness of its expression, in the ―vices‖ no less than ―virtues‖ of the
person. Part of the task of this essay is to resolve the apparency of this contradiction.
I
Background argument: Mythical and Homeric roots
Philosophical literature from the time of Plato regards passion ―pathos‖ as a
happening—as passive, as an experience that interferes with the active rationality of
virtue. Passion here is most often associated with pain and pleasure; to the degree it is
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associated with desire (again as something that is passively suffered) its occurrence is a
challenge to be overcome by rational deliberation and control.
The question to which this essay is a response is whether there is rooted in the
literature of Greek Epic and Tragedy a different account to be given of virtue/excellence,
one in which the passion of the hero is not passive suffering but an active engagement in
the project of his or her life. One need only consider Medea to see the point of this. The
word used in the acknowledgment of heroic character is ―agathos‖ (Good/Great!), for
example ―Achilles agathos!‖ In later tragic literature, a similar meaning is invested in
praising great passion at the heart of some courageous or memorable action. So even if
one agrees to the conceptual limits of pathos as ―passive‖, the active and generative
passion of the heroic requires an accounting. The passion of virtue can be alternatively
framed in the language of the times, for example, as a divine energy that flows through
the actions of the hero—that is, that the heroic action is magnified through the invasive
and compelling will of the gods. Once the god‘s drop out of moral life, however, we
must continue to account for passion as formative in the excellence of action and
discernable in the judgment of that character.
Although Arete was a female daimon—the spirit of virtue, excellence, goodness
and valour—the word arête/ virtue is related to the Greek god of War Ares. This is partly
explained in that virtue was first associated with a warrior culture. This odd
masculine/feminine conceptual confluence of arête attests to the complexity of the
Homeric concept of virtue but even so it is a difficult fit. Ares, as the god of war, is
attended by Terror and served by Eris/ Strife. His character is decisive but impulsive,
fearless but combative, determined but bloodthirsty. The Homeric arête—virtue
understood in this range of excellence—is a far stretch from the later period of Hellenic
philosophy in which virtue or excellence is limited to arête that is more and more
comparative and descriptive in its valuative use. Indeed one seemingly can speak equally
of the virtue of a man (the comparative and functional excellence of sophrosyne, good
judgment) or of the virtue of a knife (the comparative and functional excellence of good
cutting.)
In terms of moral life, one may wonder what may be lost in moving to this latter
and now common functional domestication of the concept of virtue. My concern here is
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to restore a broader and more complex idea of the excellence of character which is
manifest throughout the world of literature. What I have in mind is suggested in the
following comment from Nietzsche:
It is not in satiety that desire shall grow silent and be submerged, but in beauty.
Gracefulness is part of the graciousness of the great-souled…There is nobody from
whom I want beauty as much as from you who are powerful: let your kindness be your
final self-conquest. Of all evil I deem you capable: therefore I want the good from you.
Verily I have often laughed at the weaklings who thought themselves good because they
had no claws.
--Nietzsche, ―On those who are sublime‖ from Thus Spake Zarathustra

This angular concept of excellence/virtue in literature finds expression well beyond the
range of tragic heroes and Nietzschean Ubermenchen, for example in the following
ordinary of the Elizabethan sonnet:
They that have power to hurt and will do none,
They rightly do inherit heaven‘s graces
…
They are the lords and owners of their faces,
Others, but stewards of their excellence.
--Shakespeare, from Sonnet XCIV

II
In opposition to the standard view that character is formed through the rational
constraint and domestication of passion, I will try to show how the poetic imagination in
Western literature transcends the ethics of the disjunction of passion and reason in its
examination of moral life, which in turn will show an essential connection between
passion and virtue.
Although some modern naturalist views tend to locate virtue in feeling, with
rational reflection as a developmental addendum, the division of passion and reason
invariably reasserts itself in favor of reason when general rules of valuation are formed
and virtues normatized. However, it can be argued that virtue itself is an expression and
modality of passion even within the foundational Greek and Judeo-Christian traditions.
The importance of this recognition of a fundamental and essential connection between
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passion and virtue is that it provides the imagination with a poetics of moral sensibility
independent of the inhibitions and prohibitions of custom and free of social
embarrassment or excuse for public sanction.
The first expressions of virtue in Western literature—that is, of the excellence of
character distinct from praise in honor of the attributes of the gods—is found in the
heroic literature of the archaic Greeks. Recent scholarship suggests that Greek literature
is not independent of ties to the Levant, however, and so its substance and form has
elements of even earlier oral traditions. For example the epic of Gilgamesh may be
argued as a formative model for part of the language and structure of the Homeric epic.
Should this be so, and some aspect of it is surely so, then Greek literature and the
language of passion and virtue that we discover in the Greek world bridge earlier
cultures, and associative expression extends back into the Sumerian mists of oral culture
and story telling. At the very least, this line of research re-connects the sometimes
hermetically sealed literatures of Hebraic and Hellenic cultures.
Within the Greek literature available to us, virtue only later in the classical period
of philosophy came to be analytically classified as commonly normative, a matter of
public ethos (character) and social mores (customs.) Earlier, however, virtue is expressed
in the epic literature of the Iliad in uncommonly singular terms: the virtue of the hero,
whether Archive or Trojan—swift-footed Achilles or man-slaying Hector—is embodied
and recognized in the unique character of his passion: Achilles agathos; Hector agathos.
The expression here is an affirmation in praise of unique stature. The virtue of Achilles is
of a piece, the whole of his character embodied in the passion of its expression.
Nietzsche famously laments the re-framing (and de-fanging) of the agathos of warrior
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culture into the rationalized arête of the classical Polis where the emphasis is on the civil
virtues of harmony and justice in human community (the meaning of polis), rather than
the unique character of heroism that distinguished the individual warrior. But even this
reconstituting of virtue—of agathos into the civilizing arête of political life—is arguably
a matter of transformed not mitigated passion. The ironic voice of Socrates, the
censorious preclusions of Plato, the therapeutic revisions of Aristotle all attest to a shift in
which the collective and distributive passions of political life displaced the bellicose
passions that once rose above the sound and fury of the killing fields. Even so, the bond
of virtue and passion common to both cultures—albeit transformed—is preserved. The
resolute courage of the embattled statesman is not the sustaining courage of the embattled
warrior, but the excellence of virtue in both is manifest in the different passions of their
engagement.
Virtue/ arête in the Classical Greek world is most often referenced by the
―cardinal virtues‖ of wisdom, courage, moderation, and justice. It is significant, of
course, that these are virtues attributable to the male citizen of the polis—a woman‘s
arête, for example in Aristotle‘s account, is to observe the decorum of obedience. The
cardinal virtues are familiar to us through Plato‘s analysis in the Republic where he aligns
each virtue as the excellence of that activity natural and appropriate to defining aspects of
the individual as well as the sustaining resources of the state. Recall that in the individual
the virtue of intellect is wisdom, the virtue of will is courage, the virtue of appetite or
desire moderation, and each has an analogue within the organic totality of the State.
Justice, finally, is a comprehensive virtue that ensures the harmony and health of the
individual and state by giving each functioning part its ―just‖ due. On this reading of
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Plato, the virtue of justice is not simply that of rational constraint, but rather an active
ordering of the passions as well as the faculties of intellect, spirit, and appetite.
It requires little argument to show that wisdom is a virtue: excellence in the
exercise of intellect. It is only slightly more of a task to show that wisdom is equally a
passion—an expression of the aspiration, in Plato‘s terms, to understand what it is we
already in some sense know—to transform knowledge into understanding—to make
knowledge part of our very being. This is the rationale of Plato‘s claim that Virtue is
Knowledge. Knowledge is only virtue, however, when it becomes embodied in
character. Aristotle later provides just this rule: that some subjects (ethics, politics) can be
understood only by being made part of the learner‘s very nature and he adds… this takes
time. Much the same can be argued of courage. The virtue of courage is manifest in the
passion of engagement in the face of fear. Courage must become a disposition to act, that
is, be made an indelible feature of character; but we must be moved to act, and reason
alone, as Hume has persuasively argued, is insufficient to move us to action. Courage
consists precisely in the passionate conviction that one must act notwithstanding a
cognitive awareness of danger.
The critical culture of modern ethics began with Descartes‘ attempt to
demonstrate that Man exists as a thinking being, such that will or volition functions only
as an on-off switch, an executive ‗yea‘ or ‗nay‘ to the rational cognition of clear and
distinct ideas. This skeptical turn helped to further divide reason and passion and
conceptually divest virtue of the energy needed to realize action. Hume‘s corrective
reminder that Man is not only a thinking being, but a feeling and deciding agent and that
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passion is required as a motive to action served to conceptually reconnect passion and
virtue in the ordinary of moral life.
In this light, virtue is portrayed and explored in literature in terms of the full and
variegated passion of human beings. It thus provides a field of meaning within which the
moral character of virtue and passion is mutually and fully developed. Virtues expressed
in the context and time of their portrayal in drama or the novel make no specific claim on
our allegiance, but appeal rather to a critical range of imagination and understanding.
Achilles remains ―agathos‖ in all his tent-hiding, back- sliding resentment, no less than in
taking up arms in personal vengeance and desecrating the body of noble Hector. We are
not invited to judge nor are we inclined simply to admonish Achilles, and so his actions
remain full bodied and fully articulate in their human expression. Literature rarely is
saddled with sorting between virtues and vices. The passions that engage human beings
in life as they are expressed through literature are allowed a depth of expression in which
we recognize that excellence may be over-determined and other directed, that virtue may
turn vicious in the energy of its excess. The lesson of literature (beyond the domain of
morals and legislation) is that there is a continuum in the energies of passion such that
―virtues‖ become ―vices‖ and vice-versa: both can contribute to without diminishing the
excellence of character.
III
One way to approach the great history of Western literature from the Epics of
Gilgamesh and the Iliad, from tragic and comic drama through medieval passion plays to
the pulp novels and popular theatre of today is to note that human beings have grown no
new emotions since coming out of Eden (or down from the trees.) This is part of the

8

explanation of how it is we can respond to literature written thousands of years ago yet
we will not pick up much less read a computer software book a year after its publication.
We find ourselves responsive to the outrageous courage of Gilgamesh whatever its excess
and arrogance, and are drawn into the great wrath of Achilles however irrational its
provocation. In each case we are moved by archaic passions that still haunt the human
heart and mind and so find resonance with the literature of its expression. However one
defines the virtues—as human excellences of mind and spirit that variously inform and
direct—the response of action is inclusive of the divergent energies that contend with the
order of our individual and communal lives.
We have noted that the originating discourse about virtues in the archaic Greek
period developed into the Classical ideal of the four cardinal virtues, which in turn and in
one or another way find a place within the expanded empire of the Roman World. At the
advent of Christianity, however, a dramatic and creative break occurs in the relocation of
passion and virtue. Christianity, which brought Judaism directly into contact with
Classical Greek thought, proclaims a different spiritual sense of passion and transforms
the cultural expression of moral life into new and very different virtues under the aspect
of a very different Deity. The generative Christian virtues of Faith, Hope, and Love
include others equally divergent from the cardinal virtues of the classical Greeks. The
Christian virtue of humility, for example, makes the Greek virtue of pride into a vice. In
general, Christian virtues have the effect of turning away from public disclosure (a
primary element in the Cardinal virtues), and so the discourse of passion turns intimately
inward to a concern for the secret soul.
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This exchange of gods and the transformation of the passions of virtue also breeds
a change in and of literature. One is no longer living a public life disclosed in the free
and open venue of the polis where actions are to be judged and character assessed under
penalty of utter visibility, nor morally ordered within the vast space of the Roman Empire
where prudence is the common coin of virtue. Rather, in Christian community one lives
the private life of the soul, whose secrets only the God can know. In this new moral
scheme the pain of viciousness is not from the shame of public disclosure, or from stoic
disharmony from nature, but from an absolute alienation from God, the source of all
value and life. The difference between Hellenic and Hebraic cultures is usually indexed
in terms of ―shame culture‖ (Greek) and ―guilt culture‖ (Hebrew). Arguably the
Christian synthesis incorporates both, so that the individual is now subject to cycles of
guilt and shame—guilt for what one has done; shame for what one has become in the
doing (no longer that of public disclosure, but as it were naked before God.)
The relational convergence of passion and virtue is in some ways clarified in this
transition from the cardinal virtues of Hellenic culture to the ordinal virtues of JudeoChristian Culture—from the Classical imperatives of Wisdom, Courage, Temperance and
Justice, to the Christian commandments of Faith, Hope and Love. It is clear in context
that the latter are not to be understood as feelings but passions, not descriptions on what
to feel but prescriptions on how to live, and as such they constitute an order of virtue in
the passionate resolution of commitment. Conceptually, the way has already been
prepared in the religious expression of the Passion of Christ, understood not merely as a
passive suffering, but as a willful offering that confronts the violence of office with the
charity of forgiveness. It is in that symbolic event that the passional virtues of faith,
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hope, and charity find completion. In each tradition—profane and political/ religious and
scriptural—the excellence of life although differently construed in emphasis, requires the
passion of virtue for its realization.
The truncated scheme I have presented so far concerning the historical
foundations of Western cultural values should at least suggest that guilt and shame are
two sides of the same coin in the critical framing of human passion. Clearly guilt frames
the actions of Achilles dragging the dead body of great Hector around again and again
before the Walls of Ilium venting his rage, exulting in the blood lust of victory, though it
is shame and a concern for honor that will move him later to relent and give over the
warrior‘s body to his father, Priam. This is a complex scene in which one might argue
that Achilles‘ action is less one of compassion for Priam than it is a recollection of his
own father—that is, that this whole issue remains one about Achilles.
Passions of vengeance and rage—the reflective guilt of excess and the shame that
attends dishonoring another—is presented in the literature of the Iliad in a way that
exemplifies rather than undermines the virtue of Achilles. Moreover this paradoxical
expression of virtue is recognized and understood through the timeless quality of its
passion. In literature, a response of approbation or disapprobation remains much the
same however much the particular historical priorities of virtue are altered or realigned.
That the virtue of pride is given one valuation in the warrior cult of Greek culture and the
virtue of humility its seeming opposite is valued above or in place of it in Christian
culture does nothing to affect the force of the expression of both in world literature.
Aristotle‘s familiar classification in the Poetics which determines the genres of
literature in how characters are depicted—as superior, equal to, or inferior to nature or to
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ourselves—is still broadly accepted. This classification makes it possible after more than
two thousand years to continue to discuss virtue and passion appropriate to and expressed
in each genre from epic literature to tragic and comic drama. Nietzsche makes use of
Aristotle‘s categories in a parallel account in the Birth of Tragedy, and Northrop Frye‘s
contemporary explication of ―fictional modes‖ in Anatomy of Criticism directly mirrors
Aristotle‘s description. Whatever historical emphasis may be accorded the value of
virtues they remain within the literary constants of Aristotle‘s relational description.
Although it is true that archaic passions remain at the heart of what is moving in
literature, and the virtues which refine the passions remain similarly accessible to ancient
or modern literature and life, we have acknowledged that inversions and distortions occur
as well. It is a familiar feature of literary criticism to contrast the classical idea and ideal
of the heroic with the ironic expression of the anti-hero in contemporary literature,
although clearly there are strands of irony already in the work of Euripides where the
focus becomes more one of psychological than spiritual analysis. In any event, the great
deeds of warriors unique in their attributes no longer frequent the battlefields of our age;
they are replaced by soldiers in uniform functioning as replaceable parts in an indifferent
machine that mass produces death and destruction. Even so, we still speak of courage in
the face of fear, of loyalty to comrades standing in the ranks of death and of honoring
those who died however unwilling in service to a cause however meaningless. But
Walkuries no longer ride out to carry the fallen dead to Walhalla; in our time there are
only weary death-details that toe-tag naked remains for the body-bags that mark the
effluence of war. Thus it is hardly surprising that a later literature, accustomed to peace
and aware of the mindless destruction and the anonymity of its victims finds the passions
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of war and the romance of victory less inspiring to virtue. It is only within a sustained and
brittle sometimes bitter irony that such virtues find a voice. Compare only the opening
lines of the Iliad ‗Sing, Muse, of the wrath of Achilles…‘ with the closing lines of
Hemingway‘s A Farewell to Arms : the words ‗honor‘, ‗courage‘…became meaningless
and profane…only the names of places had any meaning… Or again, compare the
dramatic intensity of Hamlet‘s engaged deliberation with the wages of life and death—
whether nobler to take up arms against a sea of troubles…or turn those arms against
oneself and end it—with the ironic meditation of J. Alfred Prufock‘s disengaged
contemplation of a life measured out in coffee spoons: No I am not Prince Hamlet, nor
was meant to be… We have already noted the remove from the ancient warrior in armor
to the modern soldier in uniform; consider the further remove from the immortality of
remembered heroes of the Iliad to the mortality and anonymity commemorated in the
tomb of the Unknown Soldier, and the even further remove to Auden‘s ironic depiction
of the Unknown Citizen. But with all the revisions, revaluations, and re-versioning of
virtue, the passion of literature in the expression of these values and virtues remains
intact. The virtues and passions of Hamlet are not those of Prufrock; the moral exhaustion
of Hemingway‘s soldier is not the moral exhilaration of Homer‘s warrior; each man on
the battlefield of Ilium is not the Everyman of Pilgrims Progress, much less the Anyman
of Auden‘s citizen. But the passion of their expressions in literature gives voice to the
character of an age and forms the substance of our moral heritage as human beings.

IV
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Man is an adverbial creature in the sense that his defining activities are valued in
terms of how they are done. Well or ill, courageously or cowardly, wisely or foolishly,
justly or unjustly, gracefully or crudely, courteously or rudely, viciously and cruelly or
gently and graciously. We speak casually of ―the virtues‖ or conversely of ―the seven
deadly sins‖ but of course there are no such things. Such words are linguistic reminders
about human activities; in refinement they function in the valuation of human action.
Virtue, first analyzed in Classical Greek philosophy as an excellence of the
human mind and spirit is not that which sets the animal man apart from other animals—
the possession of logos (language, reason) already does that—but rather that which attests
to the possibilities of greatness in human kind. When Homer earlier remarks that of one
race are gods and men, he has in mind those characteristics of spirit in action that mark
the possibility of transcendence of the commonplace. Shakespeare speaks to the point in
a similar way in Hamlet‘s memorable declension of ‗this paragon of animals‘:
What a piece of work is man: How noble in reason! how infinite in faculties! in
form and moving how express and admirable! in action how like an angel! in
apprehension, how like a god! the beauty of the world! And yet…this
quintessence of dust…‖(Hamlet: II, ii 115-117.)
It is a mistake to think that virtue has to do only with ―the good‖ in the sense of
respectable or allowable and that a check list can be made of the virtues to measure the
acceptability of character much less the depth of the human soul. There are two primary
sources for this mistake—Rational philosophy and Biblical scripture. In the pre-judicial
analysis of Greek philosophy the bifurcation and preference for reason over passion
insisted on rational moderation as the defining feature of virtue. Scripture, on the other
hand, requires obedience to God in place of or in addition to reason, which makes the
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good life one sanctioned by divine will. So the ―good life‖ is marked out in both Hellenic
philosophy and Hebraic scripts as one of rationality and obedience. We have insisted that
Greek literature, in contrast with classical Greek philosophy shows a preference for
passion over reason as a defining feature of moral life. In a similar fashion the flesh and
blood characters of the Old Testament, in contrast with the purities of Hebrew law, and
exceeding the pieties of the New Testament, provide additional cultural testimony that
the depth and worth of life is fully understood only within the reach and extremes of
human passion.
In fact, any and every human activity can be done well or not. The remarkable
and distinctive genius of world literature is its capacity to demonstrate the full expression
of human excellence in conception, resolution, and action. We may find admirable and
feel resonance with the actions and personalities of the most demonic of creatures: with
the fallen Angel who proclaims that it is better to reign in hell than serve in heaven; with
the misshapen form of a King whose winter of discontent is turned glorious summer only
in the contrivance of malice; with the sea captain whose life becomes an obsession with
vengeance, and with the savage genius of an ivory hunter who can embrace the heart of
darkness and pronounce judgment.
Literature, broadly speaking is an investigation of the moral life of human beings
where ―moral life‖ is understood to encompass all activities of consequence to human
beings—a use of ―moral‖ familiar to 18th century Enlightenment. Virtue portrayed in
literature as the excellence of action and character, examines the depths of moral life
found in the passions at the heart of human aspiration—whether they be for good or ill,
whether generated by an overweening pride and ambition, or by humility and reciprocity,
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whether motivated by lust and greed, or intended with benevolence and generosity. In
the world of great literature there are no simple bifurcations of vice and virtue, of good
and evil. Acknowledging with St. Augustine, that all being is good, literature proceeds
without the Augustinian apologetics that evil exists only as an absence of good. Both
good and evil exist fully in the world of literature as positive forces and not necessarily in
opposition. That is to say, the moral interest of literature is not normatively prescriptive.
The insight as well as attraction of literary expression is discovered more often in the
exception than the rule. Heroic character, for example, is embodied in an excess that
violates the norm of expectations, whether in terms of nobility or villainy. The
exemplary figures in literature from Greek myth, classical epic and tragic literature, and
from Biblical scripture through fairy tales to modern fiction are notable not for their
―moral goodness‖, but for the exceptional passion of their projects. Consider the history
of this assemblage in ancient myth and literature: the fateful ‗parricides‘ of Uranos and
Kronos, the arbitrary injustices of the Olympians, the thieving of Prometheus, the
ecstasies of Dionysos, the wrath of Achilles, the connivings of Odysseus, the audacities
of Agamemnon, Orestes, Oedipus, and Antigone… It is much the same with the
principals of Hebrew literature and scripture, from the first rebellion of Satan and the
disobediences of Adam and Eve, through the treacheries of Cain and the ensuing events
east of Eden. It is not that evil is more attractive or exciting than good, it is that good and
evil are not opposites but inclusive if sometimes limiting concepts that constitute the
moral lives of human beings. Both are requisite to a creature who must find a resource of
energy in the full scope of human possibility.
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There is arguably a learning factor that contributes to the human interest in
exception. Whether or not exception proves the rule, those things learned as exceptional
are indelibly imprinted in ways that routine occurrences are not. Tolstoy makes this point
memorably in the opening lines from Anna Karenina that every happy family is happy in
much the same way, whereas every unhappy family has an unhappiness all its own.
Paradoxically what we learn most and best about ourselves through literature comes
through an embodiment of the exception for it is the intensity of difference that imprints
the virtue of passion on consciousness.
V
It may be useful, in discussing virtue in the context of moral life, to distinguish
between passion and emotion in terms of both degree and kind. Ethics is prescriptive of
normalcy and as such it focuses on obligation, on what binds action to a rule. Emotions
present a problem in that they are variable and not subject to rule, hence the contrast of
emotion and reason, the latter being the predictable domain of moral deliberation.
Occasionally there are forceful counter arguments presented against this configuration,
which reject reason as definitive of morals. The most persuasively famous is that of
Hume, who suggests rather that reason is a slave to the passions, and who argues that
reason has no moral force, and so locates moral life and sense in feelings.
Hume makes point that if we do not respond sympathetically to the pain of
another person, no amount of reason will move me to care about her plight. But having
said this, we are a long way from understanding the passion of virtue. Feeling, emotion
(pathe) has as its central meaning something endured or something that happens to one.
It is, if not negative or neutral, then reactive to some event or situation. Aristotle remarks
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relative to this point that one cannot be blamed for feelings only for actions. Even
Aristotle, however, has insisted that emotions themselves must become rational in the
well tempered soul, which indicates that reason is not an independent faculty, or at least
that emotions somehow partake in and are not simply subject to reason.
The point here is that even in its philosophical framing passion (pathos) has an
active connotation—a positive energy that is not merely reactive. This suggests, for
example, that the essential difference between anger and wrath is one of kind, not degree.
The wrath of Achilles with which the Iliad begins is anything but passive, and not merely
reactive; passion here is not limited to a sense of offense, but marks a positive and
generative force only occasioned by that offense. It is this passion that is the source of the
judgment or acclimation ―Achilles agathos!‖; passion is the way in which Achilles
proclaims himself, the measure of his character. It is here and in this sense that passion
and virtue converge. In the milder culture of later times virtue is more generally
recognized, for example, in the passion for justice. Finally, in its most comprehensive and
universal sense, the virtue of humanity is realized in the passion for life.
Plato famously distrusted and devalued passion, particularly in its characteristic
poetic expression, which he nonetheless credited as a kind of divine madness. But in the
Symposium Plato dialectically develops the journey of the philosophical spirit toward the
beauty of truth, in which Eros, desire, remains at the root of what moves and provides the
energy of that spiritual quest. In this context philein sophian—the love and pursuit of
wisdom that defines philosophy for Plato—serves to qualify his earlier rejection of
passion and existentially anchor wisdom in pathos. It is passion for the beauty in life that
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leads to the love of wisdom and the truth of understanding—to the eidos of the Good
which in turn is the source both of enlightenment and the virtue of a fully human life.
So understood, the quadrivium of excellence in the classical world—wisdom, courage,
temperance, justice—owe their existence and force in the life of individual and
community to pathos (passion), no less than logos(reason.)
Whether one aspires to a greatness of soul (the tragic hero) or only to the
excellence of a particular spiritual endowment (the range of humanity), movement only
begins in the passion of that commitment. Justice in the state or in the soul of the
individual is never realized without such commitment. The road to virtue, to the
excellence of character in action, whether for the tragic hero or the stoic everyman, must
overcome obstacles, excuses, occasions and all the other roadside distractions that
imagination can invent. The world of literature is a collected canon of investigations of
the lateral movements of human passion, a comprehensive and dynamic manifold of
heroic achievement and ironic failures in the human aspiration to virtue. In its positive
form, however, passion attests to that most common and ordinary virtue that defines
humanity—a tenacity of spirit and resolve that affirms the beauty of life in the face of
inevitable defeat.
It would be appropriate for my point to quote the whole of William Faulkner‘s
memorable remarks on his acceptance of the Nobel Prize for literature. You may
remember that he ends with this:
I believe that man will not merely endure: he will prevail. He is immortal, not
because he alone among creatures has an inexhaustible voice, but because he has
a soul, a spirit capable of compassion and sacrifice and endurance. The poet's, the
writer's, duty is to write about these things. It is his privilege to help man endure
by lifting his heart, by reminding him of the courage and honor and hope and
pride and compassion and pity and sacrifice which have been the glory of his past.
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If the rational imperative of logos in philosophy is ―Only connect!‖ its mirror
image in literature is the poetic imperative of pathos in poetry: ―Always affirm!‖
However tragic the realization of the hero, the anguish of her cry is still an affirmation of
the beauty and sublimity of life. The classical Greek insistence on this point is confirmed
in the practice of ending the trilogy of each tragic drama during the festival of Dionysos
with a Satyr play in which life is again affirmed in all its primal and libidinal passion.
The contrast in the modern ironic turn of culture and literature is only apparent in this
context. In The Heart of Darkness, for example, in which the tragic and ironic are
contrasted in the characters of Kurtz and Marlowe—two faces of the human spirit:
participant and spectator—the tragic affirmation of Kurtz ―The Horror!‖ is followed by
the ironic commentary of Marlowe on his own confrontation with the heart of darkness
―Droll thing life is…‖ But Conrad finds poetic affirmation in both characters: the virtue
of passion is discovered both in action and reflection, in the character of the tragic figure
who can look into the heart of darkness with complete conviction, and in the ironic figure
who can only go on to tell the story. It is arguably a further remove from the classical
passion of the tragic hero to the ironic anti-hero of modern poetic fiction—from
Prometheus to Prufrock—but the passion of virtue is found still, if only in the ironic
beauty of its expression.
Even in the most despairing moments of tragic drama in which man but frets and
struts his hour upon the stage in a life full of sound and fury there is no remorse in the
journey that has led to this revelation. Even in the recognition that all our yesterdays
have but lighted fools the way to dusty death, there are still no vapid regrets or
recriminations. This, simply, is how it is with human kind. But in the interim between
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birth and death the human spirit has been shown to reach beyond its limits to rival the
gods and in this recognition is an affirmation of the passion of human virtue. The gods
have no need to try and fail, to live and die—indeed have not the capacity to do so. The
passions of the timeless gods are pale by comparison to those of a creature caught in the
ravages of time, in which passion is all that sustains him. The gods are without virtue,
not because they lack restraint, but because only human beings must risk and suffer and
fail in aspiring to become what they can only imagine.
The tragic and comic masks of dramatic literature serve finally as expressions of
the conflicting and inclusive faces of humanity. As a poetic prism of the human
condition, literature embodies an affirmation of passion, an expression of that singular
virtue that ennobles the character of the human spirit.
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